🚀 go-pugleaf

Compared to such momentous domestic issues as the Bank War, the
Nullification Crisis, Indian Removal--or for that matter Peggy Eaton's
morals or lack therof--US foreign relations during the Jackson
administration have received relatively little attention.  Yet one foreign
policy issue was of such importance that it led to what Roger B. Taney
later called "the most dangerous moment of Genl. Jackson's
administration"; it not only jeopardized Jackson's struggle with the Bank
of the United States but could have led to war with France.  This had to
do with the "spoliation" claims against France (for damage inflicted on
Americans during the Napoleonic Wars).  In this post, I will give the
background to the affair, relying mainly on Robert V. Remini's account in
*Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy 1833-1845*; in Part
Two I will explain how the matter was ultimately resolved and raise some
what-ifs about it.

Anyway, US minister William C. Rives concluded a treaty with the French on
July 4, 1831, in which France agreed to pay 25 million francs in six equal
annual installments. France also agreed to lower her duties on long-staple
cotton imported from the United States. In return the US agreed to reduce
its duties on imported French wines. The ratifications were exchanged in
Washington on February 2, 1832, and Congress fulfilled the pledge to
reduce the wine duties. His mission apparently successful, Rives returned
home in September, 1832, and Nathaniel Niles, who acted as chargé
d'affaires, took over the American legation in Paris. Secretary of State
Edward Livingston notified Niles on February 8, 1833, that he should
inform the French government that the secretary of the treasury had drawn
a bill on the French minister of finance for the first installment of the
indemnity along with interest on the remaining installments. The draft,
dated February 7, 1833, was sold to the BUS and transferred to the Bank's
agent in France for collection.  Niles dutifully informed the minister of
foreign affairs, the Duc de Broglie, who expressed shock and dismay at the
action of the American government in drawing a bill through the BUS
instead of waiting to collect the money directly from the French
government. However, Broglie assured Niles that the French government had
no intention of reneging on its commitment. It was simply a matter of
getting the necessary appropriation from the Chamber of Deputies.
Unfortunately, despite these reassurances, the Chamber neglected to
authorize the first installment at its next session--even though the
payment by then was long past due.

At this point, Jackson re-shuffled his cabinet yet again, Livingston being
sent to France as minister, and Louis McLane shifted from Treasury to
State.  McLane was rather testy toward the French, especially because they
blamed his action as treasury secretary for precipitating the problem in
the first place. (Besides, McLane as an ex-Federalist never had much
sympathy with the French.)  Jackson also was getting impatient, and
suggested that if the French didn't give strong assurances soon, he would
recommend that Congress increase the duties on French goods.  To make
matters worse, Nicholas Biddle presented the president with a 15 percent
service charge for the bounced check.  Jackson absolutely refused to pay
it--whereupon Biddle coolly deducted it from the dividends paid on the
government's stock in the BUS!  At this point Jackson was furious with
both Biddle and the French, but still hoped that Livingston could resolve
the problem once he arrived in France (which did not happen until
September).

Livingston--like Niles before him--received assurances from the French
that the necessary appropriations would be passed at the next session of
the chambers.  The appropriation bill was introduced in January 1834,
reposed in committee for two months, and was finally debated by the
Chamber for five days beginning on March 28, 1834.  The stunning result:
Despite the fact that the committee had unanimously recommended approval,
the motion to pay the indemnity was defeated 176-168.  Some members
thought the indemnity was too large.  Some monarchist deputies hated the
US because of the impact of the American Revolution on French life and
thought.  And still other deputies, especially republicans, simply wanted
to embarrass the king and the government.

For Andrew Jackson, of course, the motives of the French deputies were not
the important thing.  What mattered was that they had insulted the United
States, and he was not one to take such an insult lightly.  At a cabinet
meeting he proposed to ask Congress to issue letters of marque and
reprisal to attack French shipping.  He had the support of both McLane and
Secretary of War Cass.  Taney OTOH was horrified--the only war he wanted
was with the Bank, not with France.  He argued that the Biddle-induced
Panic had left the US in a bad condition financially for a war, and
militarily, too the US was "in no condition to go to war if it can be
avoided";  France was "greatly superior to us in her naval armament ready
for action & would probably blockade our harbors & bombard our commercial
cities before we could be prepared to meet them."  Be patient, urged
Taney, there is still plenty of time for diplomacy.

McLane vigorously disagreed.  He thought that the king and the ministers
had failed to press sufficiently for the appropriation because they
secretly hoped to avoid paying it, knowing how unpopular payment for such
a "humiliating" purpose would be to the French public.  McLane argued that
authorizing letters of marque and reprisal was not the same thing as going
to war. By the "law of nations" the US had a right to redress itself in
this manner.  McLane then cited a number of precedents and noted that
France herself had resorted to this procedure when Portugal failed to pay
an indemnity.  Taney replied that whether letters of marque constituted a
declaration of war in the technical sense was not the issue; the point was
that the French would not tamely submit to such an indignity.  Maybe
France applied it to a weak nation like Portugal, but that did not mean
that she would allow anyone else to practice it on her.

Taney left the cabinet meeting in what he later described as the greatest
anxiety and alarm he had ever felt in public life.  Jackson seemed certain
to side with McLane and Cass. Taney envisioned a nightmare scenario: the
request for letters of marque would throw the US into disarray, and would
lead to France's immediately declaring war, without even waiting for a
decision by Congress.  The Panic would become so intense that Jackson's
administration "would be overthrown in less than a month--and the Bank
with all its arrogance & open corruption fastened immoveably upon the
country."

Lacking allies in the cabinet, Taney turned to Vice President Van Buren.
They had not previously discussed the issue, but Taney was sure that a
prudent man like Van Buren would agree with him, and this turned out to be
correct.  Van Buren went immediately to see the President and they had a
long talk, after which Jackson agreed to hold off on a special message to
Congress.  Probably what most influenced Jackson to have second thoughts
was the likely effect on Jackson's own relations with Congress, especially
in terms of his struggle with the Bank.  He had no doubt he could win the
American people to his side, but whether he could get the support of
Congress--or at least the Senate, which had just censured him over the
removal of the deposits--was another matter.  And such obvious
divisiveness in the US government would simply play into the hands of the
French. Furthermore, Livingston informed Jackson that the French were
sending new instructions to Louis Sérurier, the French minister at
Washington, and Jackson decided he should not do anything until he learned
of those instructions.  As it turned out, these instructions were
sufficiently apologetic and sufficiently hopeful (claiming that the odds
of the appropriations being approved in the next session had improved,
that the government would use all legal means to win passage of the bill,
etc.) that Jackson decided not to send any message to Congress until its
new session opened in December.  The immediate crisis was therefore over.
McLane resigned in disgust.

This was only a reprieve, however.  Jackson and Livingston interpreted the
instructions to Sérurier as meaning that the Chamber of Deputies would
pass the appropriations bill during its summer session beginning July 31,
or else that a special session would be called in the autumn.  The Comte
de Rigny (who had succeeded the Duc de Broglie as foreign minister)
explained to Livingston that this was impossible:  the brief summer
session's business was purely organizational. On July 31 the Chambers mer
and listened to the king's speech--after which they were prorogued until
December 31.  Jackson was outraged:  he had delayed action in the hope
that the Chamber would act promptly, so that by the time Jackson had to
mention the matter in his annual early-December message to Congress, he
could report that it had all been peaceably resolved.  Instead, there was
now no possibility of the Chamber even considering the matter until a
month after the message.

Jackson's message, dated December 1, took off on a review of US foreign
relations.  Nation by nation, it gave a mostly positive account of US
relations with foreign countries.  Then the blow:  "It becomes my
unpleasant duty to inform you that this pacific and highly gratifying
picture of our foreign relations does not include those with France at
this time...Since France, in violation of the pledges given through her
minister here, has delayed her final action so long that her decision will
not probably be known in time to be communicated to this Congress, I
recommend that a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French property
in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt at the
approaching session of the French Chambers."
http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/aj7/speeches/ajson6.htm

[To be continued]

--
David Tenner
dtenner@ameritech.net